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Review of Criminal Convictions by
Habeas Corpus in California
By ROBERT R. GiiNuccI*
A COMPLETE discussion of the many and varied uses of the writ
of habeas corpus would be physically impossible in an article of this
length. Indeed even in the area of criminal law the uses of the writ are
quite diversified. For example the writ is available to secure bail on
appeal,' to restrain trial,2 to challenge the validity of a statute or
ordinance,3 to test the validity of extradition proceedings4 and to litigate
the claims of incarcerated prisoners respecting the terms of their sen-
tences' or the conditions of their confinement." Thus restriction of the
scope of discussion is necessary, and this article will deal with the most
challengmg and controversial aspect of habeas corpus, that is, the
availability of the writ to review a final judgment of conviction.
A conviction becomes final when the time for appeal lapses or
where the matter is heard on appeal and the judgment is affirmed.7 There
are basic differences between appellate review of a judgment of con-
viction and collateral attack on the judgment after it has become final.
This article will explain how habeas corpus has been developed into
a remedy which supplements but does not substitute appellate review.
At this juncture it might be noted that the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently broadened the scope of review in federal
habeas corpus proceedings to the point where a convicted state prisoner
* A.B., University of San Francisco, 1954; LL.B., Stanford University, 1957; member
San Francisco Bar; Deputy Attorney General, State of California.
'In re Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 11 Cal. Rptr. 547, 360 P.2d 43 (1961) ; In re Brumback,
46 Cal. 2d 810, 299 P.2d 217 (1956)
2 In re Allen, 59 A.C. 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 168, 377 P.2d 280 (1962) ; In re Howard, 208
Cal. App. 2d 709, 25 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1962).
'Although in most cases the writ is sought after trial and conviction (In re Lane, 58
Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962) ; In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116 (1960), In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946)), the
issue may be raised before trial (In re Cregler, 56 Cal. 2d 308, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289, 363
P.2d 305 (1961) ; In re Peterson, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24 (1958))
4In re Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 772, 3 Cal. Rptr. 140, 349 P.2d 956 (1960) ; In re Tenner,
20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942)
"Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 1, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960) ; In re Tartar, 52
Cal. 2d 250, 339 P.2d 553 (1959) ; In re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954)
' Convicts may not challenge matters of routine prison administration by habeas corpus,
but the writ is available for the assertion of fundamental rights. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848,
22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962), In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753,
361 P.2d 417 (1961) ; In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955)
'See CAL. RULEs oN APPEAL 24(a), 31(a)
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can obtain a retrial of factual issues or a second appeal in a federal
forum on the most minimal of allegations.' Thus the rule enunciated
in Brown v. A lien,9 namely that a federal judge reviewing a state crimi-
nal conviction might determine factual issues by a review of the tran-
script of the state court proceedings, has been abrogated or at least sev-
erely limited by the Court's recent decision in Townsend v. Sam."° And in
Fay v. Noia" the court held that failure to exhaust state remedies does
not bar the power of a federal court to issue the writ. Even before these
two cases there was much controversy surrounding the role of the
federal courts in state administration of criminal justice.' Townsend v.
Sain and Fay v. Noza will, if nothing else, add fuel to the fire. Indeed
it is not impossible that the action of the Supreme Court in so broadly
expanding the writ of habeas corpus and restricting the finality of state
court decisions may lead to congressional reaction in the form of
amendment or even repeal of the Habeas Corpus Act. 3 In any event
the recent tendency of the federal courts to broaden collateral review of
state court convictions has as yet found no counterpart in the decisions
of the Supreme Court of California which by and large have followed
a fairly consistent pattern.
Procedure
Some knowledge of the procedure on habeas corpus is helpful to
one seeking to understand the use of the writ to review criminal con-
victions. Actually habeas corpus procedure is simplicity itself. It is
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. Application for the writ
is made on a verified petition which may be signed by the applicant
himself, or by some person in his behalf. 4 Although there is authority
in other jurisdictions for the proposition that a court will issue the writ
' See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), Pike
v. Dickson, -F.2d- (9th Cir., Oct. 1963). Compare Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
'344 U.S. 443 (1953)
LO 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
" 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
" See, e.g., Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,
108 U. PA. L. RIv. 461 (1960) ; Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YAL L. J. 50 (1956).
"'Such legislation was proposed even before Fay v. Noa and Townsend v. Sam. For a
discussion of those proposals as well as a pertinent and well reasoned criticism of the
broadened scope of federal review, see Bator, Finality in Crminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAZY. L. REv. 441 (1963) Prof. Bator's article should be
required reading for anyone dealing with federal habeas corpus.
" CAL. PEN. CODE § 1474.
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on its own motion,"5 this possibility appears to be obviated in California
by those provisions of the constitution and the Penal Code which provide
that the writ is issued on a verified petition. 6
One seeking to challenge a criminal conviction by habeas corpus
concerns himself with only one rule in preparing his application, but
compliance with this rule is essential. The petitioner must state the
facts upon which the illegality of his conviction is based and his reasons
for any delay in raising the question. As the supreme court declared
in In re Swain:
We are entitled to and we do require of a convicted defendant that
he allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have a final
judgment overturned and that he fully disclose his reason for delaying
in the presentation of those facts. This procedural requirement does not
place upon an indigent prisoner who seeks to raise questions of the
denial of fundamental rights n propria persona any burden of comply-
ing with technicalities; it merely demands of him a measure of frank-
ness in disclosing his factual situation. 18
Accordingly, where the application for a writ of habeas corpus
does not state sufficient facts to enable the court to decide whether or
not the writ should be granted, a denial should be entered but without
prejudice to the filing of a new application which meets the require-
ments as enunciated by the supreme court.'9
If the application states facts warranting the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus, the court to which the petition is addressed will
issue either the writ itself or an order to the respondent to show cause
why the writ should not be issued." The respondent thereupon must file
a return to the writ or the order. This return is made to the order of
the court, not the petition." The party filing the return must set out the
grounds justifying detention of the petitioner. In cases involving a final
judgment of conviction the return will usually include the judgment
"Addis v. Applegate, 171 Iowa 150, 154 N.W 168 (1917); Goetz v. Black, 256 Mich.
564, 240 N.W 94, 84 A. L. R. 802 (1932) ; Ex parte Beckenstem, 104 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1937).
1 6CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 4, 4b, 5; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1473-75.
a' 34 Cal. 2d 300, 209 P.2d 793 (1949).
"Id. at 304, 209 P.2d at 796.
"Ibid.
20 In Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960), the petitioner
cast is allegations in the form of a petition for a writ of mandate; the lower court, however,
treated the application as a petition for habeaus corpus, disregarding the petitioner's inappro-
priate prayer for a writ of mandate.
' In re Egan, 24 Cal. 2d 323, 149 P.2d 693 (1944), In re Collins, 151 Cal. 340, 90 Pac.
827, 91 Pac. 397 (1907).
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and commitment of petitioner and general allegations that the proceed-
ings were due and regular." Then, when the writ has issued the party
seeking release must file a responsive pleading to the return. This plead-
ing is called a traverse. Failure to sufficiently traverse a return admits
the truth of the matters alleged and requires the dismissal of the petition
and discharge of the writ. This is because, as noted above, the return is
made not to the petition but to the writ. The application for a writ of
habeas corpus becomes functus officio when the order to show cause
or the writ is issued. As a practical matter, however, the parties usually
stipulate at the hearing that the petition itself may be treated as a
traverse to the return. 4
Application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made to the superior
court, the district court of appeal, or the supreme court.25 If the alle-
gations warrant judicial inquiry, an order to show cause is issued.
Where factual issues are raised in the proceedings, the superior court
is obviously well equipped to hold an evidentiary hearing. This is not
true of the appellate courts, and, accordingly, where factual issues are
presented, a referee is appointed to take evidence and determine them.
While the findings of a referee are not binding on the appellate court,
they are accorded great weight; but it is the court, and not the referee,
which makes the final determination of factual issues. 6
Matters Reviewable on Habeas Corpus
It was originally held that the writ of habeas corpus, where the
petitioner was held in custody pursuant to a final judgment, reviewed
nothing more than the jurisdiction of the committing court2 For ex-
ample a municipal court has no power to enter a felony conviction and
any attempt to do so would be beyond its jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court of California, however, has extended the availability of the writ
to review matters which cannot be characterized as jurisidictional.28
' CAL. PEN. CODE § 1480.
"In re Egan, 24 Cal. 2d 323, 144 P.2d 693 (1944) ; In re Collins, 151 Cal. 340, 90 Pac.
827, 91 Pac. 397 (1907), In re Newman, 187 Cal. App. 2d 377, 9 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1960) ; In re
Martha, 122 Cal. App. 2d 654, 265 P.2d 527 (1954) ; In re Soldavini, 64 Cal. App. 2d 677, 149
P.2d 193 (1944).
In re Stafford, 160 Cal. App. 2d 110, 113, 324 P 2d 967 (1958)
CAL. CONST. art VI, §§ 4,4(b), 5; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1475.
"In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 853, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962); In re
Martinea, 52 Cal. 2d 808, 812, 345 P.2d 449 (1959).
" See generally, Ex parte Kearney, 55 Cal. 212 (1880); Ex parte Max, 44 Cal. 579
(1872), Ex parte Branigan, 19 Cal. 133 (1861).
' "The broadened uses of habeas corpus have been rationalized by expressly expanding
the situations in which it is available to review matters over which the trial court had
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Although generalizations are dangerous in this area, it is fair to say
that the writ is available where there was error in the trial proceedings
of a constitutional dimension, which carried the risk of convicting an
innocent person."
Thus the writ has been available to a prisoner claiming he was
denied the right to counsel," that his conviction was brought about by
perjured testimony,"1 that a plea of guilty was involuntary," or that
he was, without fault of his own, erroneously precluded from presenting
a defense.3 It has been denied in situations where the questions raised
involved the admissibility of evidence" or technical deficiencies in the
accusatory pleading.
One novel aspect of the writ is its availability to a prisoner seeking
to perfect an appeal. While no extraordinary writ will confer upon an
appellate court the power to determine the appeal in the absence of a
timely notice of appeal, habeas corpus has been used to determine the
timeliness of a notice of appeal," and also to cure a default resulting
from the failure to file an opening brief after the filing of a timely
notice of appeal.37 In view of the fact that the petitioners in those cases
did not challenge the legality of their detention on the habeas corpus
proceedings, perhaps the writ of mandate would have been more appro-
'jurisdiction,' rather than by expanding the concept of 'jurisdiction.'" In re McInturff, 37
Cal. 2d 876, 880, 236 P.2d 574, 577 (1951). See also In re Seeley, 29 Cal. 2d 294, 176 P.2d
24 (1946) ; In re MoVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 264, 273, 176 P.2d 40, 46 (1946) ; In re Bell, 19
Cal. 2d 488,493-94,122 P.2d 22,26 (1942).
"See concurring opinion of Justice Traynor in In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 889, 890, 366 P. 2d 305, 306 (1961)
"In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 240 P.2d 596 (1952). But the right to counsel may be
waived at trial, and such waiver will, if intelligently made, bar relief on habeas corpus. In re
Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701,108 P.2d 10 (1940).
'In re LIndley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947) ; In re Mooney, 10 Cal. 2d 1, 73
P.2d 554 (1937). Two petitions alleging this ground are presently pending before the
Supreme Court of California. Orders to show cause have issued and the matters have been
referred to referees. In re Imbler, Crim. No. 7212; In re Rosoto, Franklin and Vlahovich,
Crim. No. 7490.
'In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 310 P.2d 15 (1957) ; In re Hough, 24 Cal. 2d 522, 150
P.2d 448 (1944). A reference has recently been held on order of the supreme court after
issuance of an order to show cause in In re Seiterle, Crim. No. 7507, a case which raises
this identical issue.
"In re Haris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305 (1961) ; In re Newbern,
175 Cal. App. 2d 862,1 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1959).
"In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953) ; see also concurring opimon of Mr.
Justice Traynor in In re Harris, supra note 30.
13In re Mitchell, 56 Cal. 2d 667,16 Cal. Rptr. 281, 365 P. 2d 177 (1961).
'In re Gonsalves, 48 Cal. 2d 638, 311 P.2d 483 (1957) ; In re Byrnes, 26 Cal. 2d 824,
161 P. 2d 376 (1945).
' In re Martin, 58 Cal. 2d 133, 23 Cal. Rptr. 167, 373 P. 2d 103 (1962).
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priate since the order of the supreme court in any event did nothing
more than direct the court to hear the appeal on the merits."s
Prerequisites for Review
A. Issues of Fact Must Be Lztzgated at the Trial
California has adopted the rule that on habeas corpus proceedings
issues of fact may not be considered which were or could have been
raised at the trial. This is simply a matter of common sense. Obvious
considerations of finality require that a criminal defendant not be per-
mitted to litigate and relitigate his case. 9 Illustrative of that rule is
the court's decision in In re Carmen.4"
Rayna Tom Carmen was first convicted of murder and assault in
1950 in the superior court of Madera county and sentenced to death.
On appeal the State supreme court affirmed the assault conviction and
reversed the murder conviction.4 At the re-trial petitioner was again
convicted of first degree murder.42 The prosecution alleged and pro-
duced evidence that the murder had been committed in Madera county.
On appeal before the supreme court for the second time, it was sug-
gsted that facts could be adduced showing that the murder had been
committed on a small tract of land within Madera county known as an
Indian allotment, which constituted Indian country within the meaning
of federal law. The contention was that therefore petitioner and his
victim were Indians and accordingly the sole jurisdiction over the of-
ense would be in the federal courts. The court denied the application
and affirmed the judgment of the conviction, noting that the facts shown
in the trial court record were insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal court.43
Carmen then instituted habeas corpus proceedings, and the supreme
court upon issuance of the writ, appointed a referee to determine the
"' Cf. Vasquez v. District Court of Appeal, 59 A.C. 606, 30 Cal. Rptr. 467, 381 P.2d 203
(1963) In the final analysis, the decisions in Martin, Gonsalves and Byrnes are the converse
of Neal v. State, supra note 17. They granted relief in the nature of mandamus despite the
prayer for an inappropriate writ, i.e. habeas corpus.
9 "In this state a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by
successive proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him." In re Connor, 16
Cal. 2d 701, 705, 708 P.2d 10, 13 (1940). Cf Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
'48 Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957)
41 People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768,228 P.2d 281 (1951)
" People v. Carmen, 43 Cal. 2d 342,273 P.2d 521 (1954).4 The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to permit a determination
that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present case, and we do not pass
on the question of what remedies may be available to the defendant to show alleged
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status of petitioner and his victim, as well as the locus of the crimes.
The referee heard evidence and made findings in support of Carmen's
allegations.
In rendering its decision denying the writ, the court concluded that
it was not necessary to consider the referee's findings of fact. The prob-
lem before it, in the court's view, was whether it might consider facts
outside the trial court record in habeas corpus proceedings generally
and in the case before it in particular. So cogent is the court's reasoning
on these points that this portion of the opinion deserves to be quoted in
full:
Traditionally the inquiry on habeas corpus has been limited to an
examination of facts appearing upon the face of the record and no
evidence dehors the record has been received to impeach the judgment.
(In re Selowsky, 189 Cal. 331 [208 Pac. 99]; In re Stevenson, 187 Cal.
773 [204 Pac. 216]; In re Nicholson, 24 Cal. App. 2d 15 [74 P.2d
288]; In re Mirando, 15 Cal. App. 2d 443 [59 P.2d 544]; In re
Murphy, 79 Cal. App. 64 [248 Pac. 1044]; In re Ballas, 53 Cal. App.
109 [199 Pac. 816]; In re Todd, 44 Cal. App. 496 [186 Pac. 790]; see
also 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, § 16, p. 456.) However, it was said in
In re Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 712 [108 P.2d 10], that "[t]he scope
of inquiry on habeas corpus in this state may... under exceptional
circumstances, extend over the entire course of proceedings in the lower
courts... and may embrace additional evidence received by this court
either directly or under an order of reference."
The scope of inquiry has been so extended in instances where a
petitioner has contested the validity of a final judgment of conviction
upon the ground that he had been denied the aid of counsel (In re
Connor, supra, 16 Cal. 2d 701) ; or that his conviction had been secured
solely by perjured testimony knowingly used by prosecuting officials
(In re Mooney, 10 Cal. 2d 1 [73 P.2d 554]); or that the law under
which he had had been convicted was unconstitutional (In re Bell, 19
Cal. 2d488 [122 P.2d 22]).
The asserted grounds of claimed lack of jurisdiction in the instant
case, however, do not appear to be of such nature as would warrant a
departure from the traditional scope of inquiry or would permit the con-
sideration of new and additional facts alleged by petitioner which do
not appear in the trial court record. The situation here presented is not
one in which the asserted lack of jurisdiction is based upon a claim by
petitioner that he was convicted of violating an unconstitutional law or
was denied any fundamental constitutional right. (See In re Bell, supra,
lack of jurisdiction in the state court. Nothing in the record indicates that the loca-
tion of the crime was 'Indian country' within the meamng of any of the statutes
which have been cited.
43 Cal. 2d at 349, 273 P.2d at 525. The court's refusal to take additional evidence on appeal
was thoroughly justified by the constitutional provision limiting its appellate jurisdiction to
matters of law, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4, and by the authorities, People v. Mendes, 35 Cal.
2d 537, 546, 219 P.2d 1, 6 (1950) ; People v. Cowan, 38 Cal. App. 2d 144, 152-54, 100 P.2d
1079, 1034-85 (1940).
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19 Cal. 2d 488, 501-502.) On the contrary, petitioner's claims are based
entirely upon federal statutes (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and
3242), the effect of which has been changed since petitioner committed
his offenses, by legislation giving the courts of tins state unquestioned
jurisdiction over offenses committed in "All Indian country within the
state." (18 U.S.C.A. § 1162, as amended Aug. 24, 1954.)
Petitioner had the opportunity to raise the jurisdictional question
here involved by presenting the alleged facts at his trials. He failed to
do so and, upon the facts there alleged and proved, the trial court's
implied determination that it had jurisdiction over the offenses was cor-
rect. To permit petitioner to now relitigate that issue would encourage
defendants charged with crimes, the jurisdiction over which might
depend upon complex factual determinations, to withhold the raising of
those issues until after they had attempted to obtain a favorable result
at a trial on the merits, and perhaps until such time as a conviction by
the court claimed to have jurisdiction would be impossible by reason
of the statute of limitations, or otherwise. (See Ex parte Wallace, infra,
81 Okla. Grim. 176 [162 P. 2d 205].) The sanction of such procedure
would permit piecemeal litigation of factual issues which should be
finally determined upon a single trial."
Mr. Justice Carter, in a lengthy dissenting opinion, argued for a
broader scope of review on habeas corpus than that allowed by the
majority."
It might further be noted that in a separate concurring and dissent-
ing opinion46 Mr. Justice Traynor stated that while he agreed with the
rule announced in the majority opinion, it should be given prospective
application only. Due to what Mr. Justice Traynor viewed as uncer-
tainty of the previous decisions of the supreme court, he concluded that
petitioner Carmen should have been given the benefit of the doubt and
allowed to relitigate the factual questions on habeas corpus.47
The rule which emerges from the Carmen case, and which is the
law today, is this: The scope of factual review on habeas corpus is
limited to the face of the record of the trial court proceedings, unless
the petitioner alleges facts outside the record which, if true, would have
impeded the correct resolution of factual issues in the trial court and
which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been presented by the
petitioner at the trial.
In re Carmen, 48 Cal. 2d at 854-55, 313 P.2d at 818-19.
Id. at 859, 313 P.2d at 822.
,Id at 887, 313 P.2d at 839.
"Carmen eventually obtained his release in federal proceedings. In re Carmen, 165 F.
Supp. 942 (N. D. Cal. 1958), af'd sub. nom. Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 973 (1960)
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B. Issues of Law Must Be Raised on Appeal
Even while broadening the availability of the writ by abandoning
the requirement of a "jurisdictional" defect," the Supreme Court of
California emphatically and repeatedly stated that habeas corpus was
to be no substitute for an appeal."' Finally, in the leading case of In
re Dixon,"0 our supreme court declared:
The general rule is that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for
an appeal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an
excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the
claimed errors could have been but were not raised upon a timely appeal
from a judgment of conviction.5'
The court stressed and it is important to note that these principles
apply as well where the alleged errors relate to an asserted denial of
constitutional rights."3
Several practical considerations support the court's limitation of
the availability of the writ of habeas corpus. For one thing, as the court
has noted, "it would obviously be improper to permit a collateral attack
because of claimed errors in the determination of the facts after expira-
tion of the time for appeal when evidence may have disappeared and
witnesses may have become unavailable." 3
A further sound reason for restricting habeas corpus is the ready
availability of an appeal to the convicted defendant. In California any
prisoner may appeal his conviction by the simple expedient of filing a
notice of appeal and requesting appointment of counsel if he is without
funds.' A transcript is available to him without charge.5 Accordingly,
the availability of a remedy by way of appeal makes unnecessary the
use of habeas corpus to review a criminal conviction except in those
See note 28 supra.
"In re McInturff, 37 Cal. 2d 876, 880, 236 P.2d 754, 757 (1951) ; In re Manchester, 33
Cal. 2d 740, 742, 204 P.2d 881, 882 (1949) ; In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723, 177 P.2d 918,
927 (1947) ; In re Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 108 P.2d 10, 13 (1940).
50 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953).
11 Id. at 759, 264 P.2d at 514.
= Id. at 761, 264 P.2d at 515. The Dixon case is interesting for another reason as well.
It demonstrated that a majority of the court was concerned enough about the use of illegally
obtained evidence to grant an order to show cause and hear argument on tins issue. Dixon
dearly forecast the decision in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), then
two years in the future.
In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 761, 264 P.2d 513, 515 (1953).
'4 The notice of appeal is simple to prepare and any ambiguities are construed in favor
of its suffciency. People v. Hagan, 203 Cal. App. 2d 34, 21 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1962), Smith v.
Ostly, 53 Cal. 2d 262, 1 Cal. Rptr. 340, 347 P.2d 684 (1959) Appointment of counsel on
appeal is a matter of right. Vasquez v. District Court of Appeal, 59 A. C. 606, 30 Cal. Rptr.
467 (1963)
People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 2d 449, 211 P. 2d 561 (1949).
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extraordinary circumstances where there are serious defects in the
proceedings which could not be corrected on appeal."6
Conclusion
The rules developed by the California Supreme Court respecting
review of criminal convictions on habeas corpus, as we have seen, have
much to commend them. The simplicity of the procedure, plus the will-
ingness of the court to depart from the artificial concept of "jurisdic-
tion" is a boon to the petitioner. Yet the rules requiring detailed factual
pleading, exhaustion of appellate remedies, and normally limiting fac-
tual inquiries to the face of the record, 7 reflect a strong policy in favor
of the finality of judgments and minimize, if not prevent, abuse of the
writ. When and if amendment of the Federal Habeas Corpus Act is
undertaken, Congress will have available the example of a sound and
workable set of rules developed by our supreme court.
"See notes 30-33 supra.
"These rules have currency. See In re Mitchell, 56 Cal. 2d 667, 16 Cal. Rptr. 281, 365
P.2d 177 (1961) If anything, the court has recently manifested a greater selectivity as
regards matters reviewable on habeas corpus. Thus Mr. Justice Traynor, in a masterful
concurring opimon, has explained why, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), notwithstanding,
the writ should not be available to collaterally attack a conviction where the question is
whether evidence in support thereof was unlawfully obtained. In re Hams, 56 Cal. 2d 879,
880, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (1961).
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